TAB

Selected Comments by the Several Offices on

ROTATION

Office of National Estimates

"....question the extensive use of testing techniques to determine the rotation plan for an individual once he has been with CIA for some time and favor the more direct method of selection on the basis of a review of individual performance."

"...This /i.e. career management program including rotation/
particularly in the sense that efforts are to be made to widen the
experience of CIA personnel, to increase the possibilities for
gaining experience in the field and for advanced education, to
the end that a competent individual can advance to positions of
greater responsibility within the agency."

"We consider the division made between the generalists and the specialists as somewhat arbitrary and, in any case, a distinction which should not be made too early in the career of the intelligence officer. We consider the distinction as perhaps valid for some fields, such as the scientific field. By and large, however, intelligence work is a mixture. We feel that often the thing which a generalist needs more is an insight into the job of the specialist, or even perhaps some intensive specialist training. By the same token, the specialist who knows all the trees, ought to know what the woods look like."

"The result of the evolutionary process of acquiring more experience in intelligence will naturally lead to the selection of the individual to positions for which he is qualified, be they positions requiring specialisation or general background and experience. The main contribution of career management lies in making it possible for individuals to prepare themselves and to make available opportunities for those who have in fact prepared."

"In the implementation of training proposals, emphasis shall be placed on a mixture of training through rotation and schooling outside the agency."

Office of Policy Coordination

"That the "career management phase" of the program be reconsidered particularly as to procedures governing job progression; security factors involved in rotating employees between overt and covert offices, and the need for a separately administered career development program for the covert offices within the framework of the general Agency program."

"It is suggested that the entire subject of career progression within the Agency be thoroughly restudied. It is, also, suggested that high motivation and personal integrity be considered among the important criteria for advancement."

"The Office is currently in the process of developing a systematic rotational program, including rotation between headquarters and the field. This program involves the various elements of placement, training, and promotion."

"....the security factor has to be emphasized by the covert offices at all times. Rotation from overt offices to covert offices and back again would present security hazards, both for the organization and for the individuals. The need for anonymity of personnel, the principle of compartmentation and other safeguards against possible penetration would be threatened if the covert offices were subject to the continued introduction of temporary personnel. OPC would welcome receiving qualified personnel from the other Offices and then training them for continued duty in covert operations. The major problem would arise in training them for, and acquainting them with, clandestine operations and subsequently returning them to completely different duties. This comment is not intended, in any way, to reflect on the loyalty or security-mindedness of rotatees from other offices, but merely to emphasize the need for avoiding the danger inherent in more than the absolute minimum of persons "knowing too much".)

Communications

".../personnel/ must be willing to accept rotation of assignment between different parts of the world and between foreign countries and Washington with the resultant disruption of domestic arrangements and the personal monetary loss which reassignments invariably involve. The operating offices must be able to move their personnel rapidly and often suddenly in order that ever-changing situations which occur throughout the world may be rapidly and adequately met."

"....all officer personnel should be required to continually rotate through tours of duty in the field, and at Headquarters, in order to gain a broad concept of the international intelligence operation and not lose intimate touch with the techniques and problems of field operations."

"The only way that competent, effective intelligence specialists and executives can be created is by a program of rotation of assignment of duties through the years with the consequent enhancement of the individual's over-all knowledge and judgement. To effect such rotation and at the same time retain a high standard of morals, the grade or rank must be in the individual; hence, a so-called "commissioned service" or system similar thereto is a requisite."

Office of Research and Reports

"We therefore recommend that the further training and rotation of promising people along lines similar to those of your proposal be put into effect regardless of the final decision concerning a Career Corps."

Office of Operations

"In view of the current difficulty which we have in replacing key personnel....we hope that the proposed rotation and withdrawal of personnel from operations for further training will be delayed...."

"...he will be considered as a member of the staff of the Office, division, or field office concerned. Otherwise there will be a tendency among the trainees to regard such assignments as temporary, or as a means of securing rotation within the Agency until the "most interesting" position is obtained."

Office of Training (Covert)

"Rotation in CIA should include instructors' duties as being vital to career management."

Office of Intelligence Coordination

"....suggest that no attempt be made to illustrate any typical rotation plan since 2t is likely to be more misleading and controversial than it is worth. For instance in the 7 August charts, ought not specialists also be assigned to other agencies and generalists have tours abroad?"

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Office of Collection and Dissemination

"Regarding the career management program, there should be more farming out of Selectees to private industry, trade and other types of private occupation than is contemplated. Some covert placement might be in order

Office of Special Operations

"A difficult security problem is immediately raised /in Career Management/ inasmuch as to give any /SIC/ employee a true glimpse of 050 would jeopardize the clandestine nature of its work. It should be recognized that a clandestine intelligence service which stresses anonymity of personnel and continuity of staff, and has operations which may continue over a period of several years, must compartmentalize its work and reveal its activities only on a need-to-know basis."